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The market for consumer credit should become more competitive if the Uniform
Consumer Credit Code (UCCC) is adopted by many states in its present form.
The UCCC is a truly radical document in that it ignores the taboos and superstitions
which, in the past, have dictated a legal form of consumer protection which has
fostered monopolistic or oligopolistic markets with accompanying higher prices for
credit. The UCCC's objective goes beyond bringing uniformity to legal regulations
among the states-it intends to change the rules of the game within each state in
order to achieve more competitive conditions and lower rates than are now available
to borrowers. While to some extent the UCCC may enlarge the market for con-
sumer borrowing by allowing competitive forces to operate more freely, its contribu-
tion in this direction will probably be minor. The UCCC preaches a greater belief
in competition than its regulations suggest. While taking great strides toward
allowing the market to determine who will be served, the UCCC's rate ceiling
structure confines the total market fairly closely to customers now being served and
segments most of the open-end portion of the market from the closed-end portion
along traditional lines.
Analysis of the UCCC will be confined to those provisions which are expected
to exert the strongest influence upon the market for consumer installment credit.
These are (a) rate ceilings upon finance charges and the doctrine of unconscion-
ability, (b) conditions of entry into competition for borrowers, (c) disclosure of the
terms of credit to borrowers, and (d) limitations upon creditors' remedies. I shall
examine the probable effects of these changes upon the types of credit services offered
consumers and upon the types of credit institutions which extend credit. However,
there is the usual caveat which must be offered. I shall assume that the UCCC is
adopted in most states without substantial change from the approved version.1 There
is no assurance that the legislatures will buy the package in its present form. If
they do not, all bets are off, and I shall try again at some future time to assess the
consequences of the UCCC upon this market.
* B.S. 1944, M.A. z946, Ph.D. x951, University of Virginia. Professor of Banking and Finance, Gradu-
ate School of Business, Columbia University.
'On the approved text of the UCCC, see Foreword, in this symposium, p. 639 n..
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I
SALE AND LOAN CREDIT: THE Ti~m-PiucE DocTmIN
The UCCC continues the practice of segregating regulations governing credit
sales from those concerning cash loans despite the economic reality that there is little
or no difference in the uses of the two forms of credit. As is obvious to the layman,
the credit sale involves the granting of credit for the purchase of goods or services
from a given (or multiple) seller(s), while loan credit involves the granting of credit
in the form of generalized purchasing power (money) which may be used to purchase
goods or services and repay debts. The economic effects of the two are virtually
identical, as borrowers can manipulate their finances to purchase goods and services
or consolidate debts.
If the legal distinction between the two had been ignored, the UCCC could have
been shorter, simpler to use, and more accessible to businessmen and interested lay-
men. Further, a number of provisions have crept in along traditional, time-price
doctrine lines, which continue segmentation of the market; i.e., a different rate
ceiling for open-end credit sales than for open-end loan credit. All in all, the
decision to maintain the legal fiction of the time-price doctrine in the UCCC has
militated against its stated objectives.
A. Closed-end Credit
On closed-end transactions, UCCC rate ceilings on credit sales were set at the
same level as those applied to cash loans. These levels-thirty-six per cent per annum
on unpaid balances less than $300, twenty-one per cent per annum on that part
of the unpaid balance more than $3o0 but not more than $i,ooo, and fifteen per cent
per annum on that part of the unpaid balance which is more than $iooo-determine
when rates of charge become illegal under the UCCC. UCCC rate ceilings are high
relative to most of the rate ceilings which exist among the effective small loan laws
in forty-seven of the fifty states.2 The belief of the draftsmen of the UCCC was that
rate ceilings should be set high to permit the free market to establish the price of
credit for all but marginal borrowers. But rate ceilings will be lowered in a sig-
nificant number of states if the UCCC is adopted. For example, on loans of $ioo,
rate ceilings established by the UCCC are lower than those allowed in the small
loan laws of fourteen states in early I968. As the credit size increases, the number
of states with higher legal rate ceilings than the UCCC's declines to nine at $3o0,
seven at $6oo, five at $8oo, three at $iooo, and two up through $i,5oo. On loans of
$xoo, the UCCC rate ceiling is set at the median of the rate ceilings which existed
in early 1968. (See Table I.) From that point on, the UCCC rate ceilings are
'Arkansas, Delaware, and Tennessee are the three states which do not have small loan structures
modeled closely on the Uniform Small Loan Law.
'Alaska, South Carolina, Oklahoma, Hawaii, Louisiana, Wyoming, Mississippi, Nevada, Florida,
Indiana, Iowa, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Utah.
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higher, reaching a peak at a credit size of $i,ioo, with credit sizes in the range
between $Iooo and $i,3oo most favored.
It is apparently difficult to justify to legislators rates around or above thirty-six
per cent per annum. For this reason, it appears to this observer that the notion of
setting rate ceilings high relative to the expected going rate on a free market was
not followed on credit sizes of $300 or less. But on credit sizes of $i,ooo or more,
rate ceilings on closed-end consumer credit transactions will be considerably higher
than typical rates of charge on the market. While it should be noted that UCCC rate
ceilings will be higher than existing median rate ceilings, the function of the UCCC
rate ceiling is to decide when rates become unconscionable, not to set the going rate
on the market, as is true of current rate ceilings.
TABLE I
COMPARISON OF MEDIAN YIELDS OF SELECTED LOAN SIZES UNDER STATE SMALL LOAN LAW




Small Loan Early 1968 Ceiling
Cash Advanced to Borrowers Laws CostW UCCC Difference
$ 100 .................................. 47 36.00% 36.00% -
200 .................................. 47 34.92 36.00 1.08%
300 .................................. 47 32.88 36.00 3.12
400 .................................. 41 30.36 34.80 4.44
500 .................................. 41 28.80 33.24 4.44
600 .................................. 41 27.48 31.80 4.32
700 .................................. 35 26.52 30.72 4.20
800 .................................. 35 25.44 29.76 4.32
900 .................................. 31 24.72 28.92 4.20
1,000 .................................. 30b 23.64 28.20 4.50
1,100 .................................. 18b 22.20 27.60 5.40
1,200 .................................. 18b 21.84 27.00 5.16
1,300 .................................. 18b 21.72 26.40 4.68
1,400 .................................. 18b 21.60 25.80 4.20
1,500 .................................. 18b 21.36 25.32 3.96
(a) loans with 12 month maturity, January 1, 1968.
(b) dollar cost of loan computed by interpolation between states above and below median.
Source: I am indebted to Helmuth Miller of Beneficial Finance Corporation for these data.
Loan size ceilings are also abolished under the UCCC The effect of this
change will help all financial institutions who are limited to lending cash in amounts
below a given size. To some extent the abolition of loan size limits will help lenders
in those states with unrealistic loan size limits for all lenders. There may be some
competitive effects among credit agencies which compete for the same borrowers-
classified by their credit risk-such as commercial banks and credit unions. There
will be considerably less competitive reallocation when loan limits are abolished
'UCCC § 3.104 defines a consumer loan as one in which, among other things, the principal does
not exceed $2.5,ooo. Thus loans exceeding $25,ooo are not directly regulated by the Code. See UCCC
§ 3.605.
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for agencies which cater primarily to different credit risks, i.e., commercial banks
and consumer finance companies. This is not to say that competition between banks
and consumer finance companies will not develop for other reasons. But with rate
disclosure, it is unlikely that high-rate lenders can draw borrowers away from
lower-rate lenders when lending similar amounts unless they differentiate the ser-
vices offered to overcome the difference in cost.
Whether rates actually charged for a given risk will rise or fall when rate ceilings
become uniform and loan limits are abolished depends upon the working of two off-
setting forces contained within the UCCC. First, there is the enlargement of the
number and kinds of creditors allowed to extend credit in the high-rate, small credit
size segment of the graduated rate ceiling on closed-end credit transactions. For the
first time added competition from retailers, banks, and others will be brought into
the market for the high-risk consumer loans previously made only by licensed lenders.
With all segments of the consumer credit market free for the first time to charge
rates up to the uniform rate ceilings, below-ceiling rates of charge will be en-
couraged by the removal of restraints on entry into the higher-risk portion of the
market. The second and off-setting force is the combination of limitations placed
upon creditors' remedies and upon agreements and practices5 which will increase
both the risk and cost of extending credit.6 It is difficult to predict the net effect of
these two factors upon marginal borrowers. But it seems likely that added compe-
tition will help to increase the number of borrowers to the extent that competition
lowers rates for given credit risks. More borrowers could be accepted under the
same rate ceiling as before unless the added risk through the loss of remedies was
the dominant force determining which borrowers are marginal.
Although the rate ceilings are the same for credit sales and loan credit on closed-
end transactions, the competitive impact of uniform rate ceilings will not necessarily
be the same, particularly in the case of marginal borrowers. At the present time, in
the many states with rate ceilings applicable to the financing of credit sales, retailers,
commercial banks, and others will be given access to a higher-rate, higher-risk
market which was previously only legally open to licensed lenders. In addition to
having the right to charge equivalent rates, retailers will remain free to absorb por-
tions of the finance charges required to make even riskier loans than those made
by lenders by increasing their cash prices, especially when their customers are
mainly credit-using, high-risk borrowers. The portions of the UCCC rate ceilings
which are low relative to those in states which have higher small loan rate ceilings
are precisely those small credit sizes which accompany the sale of low quality goods
at inflated prices to the credit-using poor:' In these instances not only will retailers
be given a competitive position which will allow them to finance higher-risk bor-
5 UCCC art. 5, pt. i; art. 2, pts. 4, 5; art. 3, pt. 4-
eUCCC § 2.201, Comment.
'See D. CAPLOViTz, ThE PooR PAY MoRa 16-20 (paper ed. 1967).
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rowers than lenders, there will be an opportunity for some retailers to lower the
markup on prices of goods sold on credit to customers when they are allowed, for
the first time, to extend credit at rates equivalent to those charged by small-loan
lenders.
Yet in those states without legal rate ceilings on credit sales, there will be little
change in the competitive atmosphere unless retailers catering to marginal borrowers
were actually charging rates higher than those permitted by the UCCC. Since such
rates would attract attention and thereby lead to regulation, it is likely that any such
specialized retailers are already inflating their cash prices rather than the finance
charge when they cater to the credit-using poor.
It will be interesting to see whether the typical retailer will move into the high-
risk segment of the consumer credit market when and if the UCCC rate ceilings are
adopted. For many years before retail installment sales acts began to be passed in
the mid-i93os, retailers were free to charge whatever they pleased, and, for the most
part, they did not undertake the financing of high risks. Rates were high because
costs were high, as they are today, but the procuring of extra gains from cultivating
the poorer risks and charging accordingly was not considered an appropriate function
for retailers. Today, or, even more important, tomorrow, the situation may well be
different, as retailers become more diversified in their interests and activities. Al-
ready, manufacturers have sensed that merchandising credit to purchasers of their
products is an essential adjunct to production and distribution. The giant retailers and
mail-order houses now realize it as well. While the typical large retailers would not
be expected to adjust their cash prices as freely to subsidize credit as a seller catering
solely to marginal credit risks, the opportunity to enter the high-risk market on the
same basis as cash lenders could make many retailers effective competitors using the
highly sophisticated credit scoring systems made possible by computers today.
To conclude, the UCCCs uniform rate ceiling on closed-end credit will allow
both lenders and sellers who were previously locked into the lower-rate end of the
market by legal rate ceilings to compete with other lenders and sellers for higher-
risk borrowers. There may be a reverse movement if the cash lenders previously
serving higher risks feel forced to compete for lower-risk borrowers when they lose
their monopoly position in the high-rate portion of the market. But because there
are many more states whose current rate ceilings are below those set by the UCCG
than the converse, there will be a net expansion in the size of the market that may
leave room for all without creating cut-throat rate competition. Thus, the short-
run competitive effects of the adoption of the UCCC should mean that higher-risk
borrowers could be served more uniformly throughout the states. The longer-run
effects could come when competition forces credit agencies to price credit according
to the degree of credit risks in the credit applicant's statement, thereby lessening the
degree of specialization among types of financial institutions in catering to certain
credit risk groups and charging a single price. When this phenomenon occurs, one
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will find competition working to bring some borrowers lower rates of charge while
other borrowers will pay more. Presumably, on average, the increased competition
should bring lower rates for given risks.
B. Open-end credit
Revolving charge accounts and revolving loan arrangements have been a growing
but still relatively minor component of the consumer installment credit market.
With the exception of charges for "supervised" loans,' the framers of the UCCC
chose to segment this portion of the market from the closed-end credit sector by
establishing lower rate ceilings. Further, higher rate ceilings were set for open-end
sales credit than for open-end loan credit.' While the justification of the time-price
doctrine has always escaped this economist's sense of logic, that distinction at least
differentiated the sale of goods on credit from the loan of money. The distinction
between open-end sale credit, called revolving charge accounts, and open-end loan
credit, called revolving loan credit, is that the credit contract is made with a seller
in the first instance and with a lender in the second. Both may issue a credit card
which can be used to purchase goods, but the seller in the first instance is given
a higher rate ceiling than the second. This makes no sense, if we disregard the
mandate of power politics.
The significance, first of all, of a lower rate ceiling for open-end credit trans-
actions than for closed-end transactions is that higher-risk borrowers will only be
able to avail themselves of the conveniences inherent in revolving credit arrange-
ments when supervised lenders develop such plans. Such arrangements are not
common today. And the existence of a lower rate ceiling for competitors which have
developed such plans for the better credit risks will insure that they will not become
common in the high-risk area tomorrow. Who is being protected by any such
limitation? When closed-end transactions are already being refinanced widely
before they fall due, is the marginal borrower being protected from himself when
he is denied the possibility of a kind of credit which some creditor may some day
think he could handle? Or is the lower rate ceiling a device to perpetuate the system
of closed-end credit transactions? Why not allow competition among all creditors to
decide when the open-end system can be made available to high-risk borrowers?
The impact of a higher rate ceiling upon revolving charge accounts than upon
revolving loan accounts cannot be anything other than a hoped-for subsidy for the
retailer because of his traditional role as originator of the revolving credit account.
' See UCCC, art. 3, pt. 5. A "supervised loan" is defined in UCCC § 3.50, and the finance charges
are set out in § 3.508. In general, a "supervised lender" is a lender licensed by the state and therefore
permitted to make loans at higher rates.
' On revolving charge accounts the charge may not exceed 2% a month on balances of $5oo or
less, and is /z% oni that part of the balance over $5oo. UCCC § 2.201. On revolving loan accounts
the charge may not exceed S8% per annum if based on a monthly charge of 1/2% on the balance.
UCCC § 3.201. For supervised lenders, higher ceilings on closed-end transactions are allowed. UCCC
§ 3.508.
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If there is some justification for allowing the seller the higher rate ceiling because
he has first access in most instances to the borrower, it is not apparent to me. This




Entry into consumer credit markets has up to now been limited in three ways:
a. limitations upon the number and geographical location of offices which may
extend loans. Such limitations apply only indirecdy to credit originated by
dealers and sold to sales finance companies and commercial banks.
b. regulations which prohibit the extension of types of consumer credit by certain
financial institutions, i.e., mutual savings banks and savings and loan associa-
tions in most states.
c. different rate ceilings which now apply to the different arrangements by which
consumers may finance the purchase of goods and services or consolidate their
debts.
The limitations placed upon the number of offices and their geographical loca-
tion apply mainly to commercial banks and consumer finance companies, among
the major credit agencies operating on the consumer credit market. Such restrictions
limit direct loans which, for the most part, require the presence of the borrower on
the premises of the lender. The purchase of paper originated by dealers and sold
to credit agencies is less affected by the limitations placed upon the location of offices.
At first glance it would appear that commercial banks have been most affected
by state statutory limitations on branching and "convenience and need" standards
for any given office location. But this is not necessarily the case since banks are not
solely restricted to the direct loan portion of the consumer credit market. When
limited to single offices or limited branching status, they have shifted their emphasis
to dealer paper, and in some states allowing statewide branching, like California,
they have found that the purchase of automobile installment credit contracts from
dealers was preferable to aggressive solicitation of direct automobile loan customers.
Consumer finance companies are most affected by limitations on entry in states
which do not allow them to do a dual business. In five of the six states which limit
entry most strongly under the small loan laws, prior permission of the supervisory
authorities must be obtained in order to do a dual businessY1
The UCCC, as noted above, substantially lowers the restraints upon entry by
See UCCC, Prefatory Note, at xv.
1 1For a listing of the relative severity of administration among 17 states with convenience and
advantage clauses, see Tx CoNusUMR FINANCE INDUS'RY: ITS COSTS AND REGULATION 113 (J. Chap-
man & R. Shay ed. 1967).
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borrowers seek out higher cost sources to obtain more credit, they again find them-
selves rationed, as lenders and sellers determine that their incomes will not support
the monthly payments required to satisfy their wants. In this situation disclosure
of rates of charge will not change many borrowing decisions. Only those relatively
few consumer borrowers, whose borrowing needs are less than their credit standing
will allow, will be rate sensitive, and for them disclosure may make a difference.
On the other hand, the constraints placed by lenders upon borrowers can be
expected to ease when adoption of the UCCC brings increased competition to the
market for consumer installment credit. There are many states where the needs of
borrowers are not met because the law created a monopoly position for regulated
lenders and then circumscribed their position so that they could only offer com-
petitive alternatives at low rates of charge. In New York, for example, a borrower
can obtain loans to consolidate debts from commercial banks at a ceiling rate of
twelve per cent per annum up to $5,ooo. The largest small loan which a borrower
can obtain from a consumer finance company under New York's small loan law is
$8oo. If he cannot qualify for a loan, say, of $i,6oo from a bank, he may try to make
two $8oo loans from adjacent consumer finance company offices, which is legal
under the law. There is no reason for the second loan office to turn the borrower
down in his application even when he knows that the borrower has just obtained
the first $8oo loan from the neighboring office because the risk is justifiable at the
nineteen per cent annual rate of charge. But under the UCCC, the borrower may
receive a rate of charge between twelve and nineteen per cent if competition works
because costs are lower for extending, servicing, and collecting one loan of $i,6oo
than two loans of $oo. And it will be most surprising if some class of lender does
not discover that he can tap a market not currently being served by offering debt
consolidation loans to borrowers who can qualify for credit at similar rates, hereto-
fore not available. And, more than likely, existing lenders who feel the loss of busi-
ness may re-price their loans so that they offer loans at different rates where there
are different credit risks to serve. The end result may be that some creditors will
continue to specialize in the kinds of business they do best while others may diversify
into a number of types of consumer installment credit.
The competitive environment brought about by the Consumer Credit Protection
Act will provide enough information so that borrowers will be better able to compare
rates of charge and dollar costs among competing credit alternatives. Credit adver-
tising can become a device that a creditor seeking to build a new market for his
services will find advantageous. If he advertises, then he must comply with the
CCPA by including in the advertisement (i) the cash price, or the amount of the
loan as applicable, (2) the downpayment, if any, (3) the number, amount, and due
dates or period of payments scheduled to repay the indebtedness if the credit is
extended, and (4) the rate of the finance charge expressed as an annual percentage
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rate.14 The very fact of disclosure and advertising of the terms of the credit contract
will place the borrower in a much better position to assess his alternatives than he
has ever been before. I foresee an initial period when borrowing habits do not
change much, simply because alternatives are the same and creditors will take
time to discover borrowers' preferences. But I fully expect that, as time passes,
creditors will seek out the profit opportunities made possible by the relaxation of
legal barriers to protected markets and that, then, the disclosure provisions will
accentuate the speed with which such attempts meet with success. For a borrower
to respond to a new credit alternative, he must be able to compare credit costs, as
he can when the uniform disclosure system is utilized by all creditors. Experience
in Massachusetts with disclosure has suggested that it will take time for borrowers
to begin to shop for credit.' 5 Further, it will not be until additional alternatives
appear that there will be appreciable gains to them from shopping. Borrowers know,
for example, that certain kinds of credit are more costly than others and that
certain types of credit institutions charge more than others for credit.' 6 In short,
borrowers have sorted themselves out pretty well among the limited alternatives
now available to them.
IV
LIMITATIONS UPON CREDITORS' REMDIES AND DEFENSES
The removal of the defenses of the purchaser of a credit contract from the buyer's
claims against the seller presents a radical change from present circumstances.'
7
This provision means that anyone to whom the rights to payment are assigned
by the seller must consider that, if the seller does not fulfill his legal obligations
under the credit sale, the financing agency will be subject to the buyer's defenses
and be legally unable to collect the indebtedness; previously such defenses have been
ineffectual against one who "innocently" purchased a negotiable note from the
credit seller. The financing agency must share in the responsibility along with the
seller for the fulfillment of the terms of the sale if he wishes to collect the indebted-
ness in full. The result will be to make financing agencies which purchase paper
from dealers more careful about the paper that they purchase, with particular em-
phasis upon the dealer's past performance in his dealings with his customers.
It is clear that this restriction will fall primarily upon the sales finance companies
and commercial banking groups which, together, hold the bulk of installment credit
outstanding. Yet a fairly large proportion of the sales finance group are sub-
"4 CCPA § 144. These requirements are only for closed-end transactions. The advertising disclosure
requirements for open-end credit are set forth in CCPA § 143.
15 See FEDEEAL RESERVE BANx OF BosroN, NEw ENGLAND BusiNEss REVIEW 2-8 (Sept. 1968).
20 For some tests of consumer knowledge, see F. Jurm & R. SHAY, CONSUMER SENSITIVTY TO
FINANCE RATES 73, 74 (Nat'l Bureau of Economic Research 1964).
" UCCC § 2.403 provides that the seller cannot take "a negotiable instrument other than a check
as evidence of the obligation of the buyer or lessee." See also UCCC § 2.404, alternatives A and B.
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sidiaries which hold paper originated by dealers either franchised or owned by parent
companies, which, in turn, can control the seller's policies s The commercial bank-
ing group and the independent sales finance companies have no such recourse and
will have to guard against fraudulent practices by marginal sellers. While such
vigilance by financing agencies helps to improve performance of sellers, it will add
to the costs of purchasing and servicing installment paper originated by dealers.
Among commercial banks, the effect of relaxing the defenses of holders in due
course of installment paper will be to increase the incentive of banks to lend
directly to borrowers and decrease their incentive to purchase dealer paper. For the
independent sales finance company, there may be further diversification away from
purchased paper. Thus, there will be some curtailment in the availability of credit
and some increase in cost resulting from the added consumer protection.
The limitations upon creditors' remedies in the UCCC comprise a wide variety
of similar provisions from existing state laws. There can be no assignment of earn-
ings in the UCCC, although voluntary authorization to deduct payments is per-
mitted if it is revocable."9 Confessions of judgment are prohibitedY Deficiency
judgments cannot be obtained after repossession or surrender of the goods purchased
when their cash price is $i,ooo or less.' There can be no garnishment of wages
prior to an entry of judgment in an action against the debtor,22 and limitations on
garnishment are provided23
The net effect of these provisions is not likely to be as substantial as their listing
implies. Most states have enacted some of these limitations on creditors' remedies,
but few have combined them as effectively. The consumer, especially the higher-risk
borrower, will pay a price for his protection. The added risk of being unable to
collect will make credit more costly. And, unless the legal rate ceiling is high enough
to allow the creditor his compensation for the risk, the credit will not be extended
through legal sources.
The limitations upon creditors' remedies affect both sales credit and loan credit,
so that no major shift between the two, as was suggested might result from the
strengthening of defenses against holders in due course, can be expected to occur
as a result of these changes. The major effect expected, however, will be in the
higher cost of obtaining credit, except for those borrowers of small amounts who
may not have sufficient leeway under the UCCC's rate ceilings to still qualify for
credit. Although the Code states that its proposed rate ceilings are "intimately
related to other parts of the act which provide for limitations on agreements and
"8 While it is unlawful under antitrust laws for manufacturers to restrict their dealers to offering to
borrowers only the financing services of wholly owned finance subsidiaries, presumably manufacturers
could exert pressure on their dealers to fulfill the terms of the sale or lose their franchise.9 UCCC § 2.410.
20 UCCC § 2.415.
51UCCC § 5.103.25UCCC § 5.104.
-8UCCC § 5.105.
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practices (Article 2, Parts 4 and 5; Article 3, Part 4) and for limitations on creditors'
remedies (Article 5, Part I),"24 it is my judgment that although it recognizes that
on balance, the costs of credit will be higher as a result of these provisions, the UCCC
does not make any real allowance for such increases in rate ceilings among borrowers
of small amounts.
CONCLUSIONS
In reviewing the potential impact of the UCCC upon the consumer installment
credit market, conflicting forces have been noted, some contributing to a widening
of the market through lower, more competitive charges and others narrowing the
market by removing some creditors' remedies available under current laws. On
balance, it appears that the competitive forces unleashed by removing much of the
current market segmentation will be dominant. Thus, the expected net result of
the enactment of the Code involves the combination of lower rates of charge for a
given credit risk and wider availability of credit to borrowers generally.
The UCCC should affect portions of the consumer installment credit market
differently. The automobile financing market, comprising about two-fifths of total
installment credit outstanding, will be least affected since it is already highly com-
petitive. There may be some extension of the market involving assumptions of the
higher risk consistent with higher rate ceilings, which would imply creditors would
accept borrowers whose credit standing and collateral previously were not acceptable.
Also, there may be competitive inroads by direct automobile lending upon the volume
of credit financed indirectly because of the changed status of the holder in due
course. Over the long run, there may be further shifts of automobile credit to
lower-rate institutions as borrowers find their lowest-cost alternatives through the
disclosure provisions of the CCPA and the UCCC. But the automobile financing
market should not be expected to show marked changes, since entry is already rela-
tively free, and existing rates of charge are well below legal rate ceilings in most
heavily populated areas.
The potential impact of the UCCC upon the market for other consumer durable
goods financing is more complex to determine. The bulk of outstanding durable
goods credit is financed by retailers who either hold their own paper or sell it to
commercial banks or sales finance companies. Further, only slightly more than half
of the states have enacted legal rate ceilings on this form of retail sales financing, and
they are substantially lower than those envisioned in the UCCC. Rates of charge
appear to be quite standard between eighteen and twenty-four per cent per annum,
although no formal study supports this observation. Nor is there any evidence that
rates are very different in states with no legal rate ceiling. Competition, or the lack
of it, in this market has been largely on a nonprice basis but most recently has
emerged in the form of a competing type of credit instrument, the all-purpose credit
2 UCCC § 2.20I, Comment.
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card. Such cards, and related plans, have emerged at costs which are comparable to
those under existing revolving credit arrangements.
The UCCC has given retailers some financial protection against further invasion
of their revolving charge accounts by allowing them a premium in the rate ceiling
above that permitted on revolving loan accounts. But the UCCC has closed off the
possibility that lower-risk, open-end revolving plans could gradually be extended to
higher risks by establishing special (lower) rate ceilings for unsupervised lenders
and sellers. Only supervised lenders can avail themselves of the opportunity to extend
open-end loans under the highest allowable rate ceilings in the UCCC. Such pref-
erential treatment risks establishing the kind of monopoly position for future high-
cost, open-end financing which the UCCC is attempting to remove in closed-end
financing.
The third major component of installment credit, personal loans, will be the
most affected by enactment of the UCCC. Commercial banks, consumer finance
companies, and credit unions are the institutions which will be most affected. Com-
mercial banks, first of all, will have a greater opportunity to make loans at higher
rates to borrowers whose credit risk is comparable to those accepted when they pur-
chase dealer paper. Further, banks and credit unions will be free to tap the market
for borrowers previously rejected at rates higher than those charged under their
current rate ceilings but lower than those charged by consumer finance companies.
By expanding their operations in both areas, commercial banks could gain sub-
stantially in the personal loan market. Both banks and credit unions, if they move
to accept borrowers in the higher risk categories, could place strong pressure upon
rates of charge (and dealers' finance charge participation) in retail sales financing
while gaining some customers from consumer finance companies. Besides expanding
their operations in states which obtain higher rate and loan ceilings under the
UCCC, consumer finance companies may wish to join the competition for bor-
rowers at rates substantially below the UCCC rate ceilings. But their experience
and special competence has always been in the handling of higher risks, and it
seems logical that they would continue to be dominant in this segment of the
market under highly competitive conditions.
If the UCCC is enacted in many states in anything like its present form, competi-
tion will be the name of the game, even if still circumscribed to some extent. For
those who have preached competition over the years, it is time to rally to the cause
and support the Code. There is much to be gained by efficient lenders, sellers, and
alert borrowers.
